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THE TONLE SAP: RECONSIDERATION  
OF THE LAWS GOVERNING CAMBODIA’S  
MOST IMPORTANT FISHERY 
Ian J. Mensher† 
Abstract: The Tonle Sap Basin is not only Cambodia’s largest inland fishery, but 
also the source of food and income for roughly one million Cambodians.  Its biodiversity 
is unrivaled within Southeast Asia, and its sustainability is vital to the socioeconomic and 
political stability in the region.  However, Cambodia’s current fishery, forestry, and land 
laws do not adequately protect the Tonle Sap Basin from over-fishing and the 
introduction of sedimentation and pollution caused by increasing development.  The laws 
do not create or reflect a model for sustainable fishing and development.  Both the laws 
currently in force and proposed legislation fail to limit logging, farming and damming 
activities that ruin fish habitat and create economic and social instability.  The myriad 
laws are at times too narrowly tailored to provide adequate protection or so broad as to 
create loopholes allowing adverse impacts from the development of agricultural lands, 
the use of pesticides, and the creation of dams.  The laws also fail to meet the 
constitutional requirements and international agreements binding upon Cambodia.  To 
remedy these legal and policy gaps, the Cambodian government should reform the 
current and proposed legislation to create more formal prohibitions on harmful activities 
and enhance local control over the management and monitoring of fishing.  Stronger laws 
are needed to stop the introduction of further sediment and chemical agents into the Tonle 
Sap Basin.  Moreover, the government must close discretionary loopholes and 
incorporate local users into a broad vision of sustainable management on the Tonle Sap 
Basin. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the end of French colonial reign, Cambodia has struggled to find 
political, social, and legal stability.  After the rule of Pol Pot1 and a 
succession of unstable socialist governments,2 Cambodia only recently 
transformed into a constitutional monarchy.  Full democratization has not 
occurred and Cambodia still relies heavily on international aid for civil 
stability.  While some may contend that its entry into World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) marks an important transition, the country and its 
                                           
†
 J.D. expected June 2007.  The author would like to thank Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr., 
Alyssa Vegter, Courtney Mertes, and Jessica Levin for their help, interest, and support. 
1
 See Kingdom of Cambodia, Cambodia Country History, http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/unisql1/ 
egov/english/country.history.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
2
 Ending Pol Pot’s regime in 1979, the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, creating the socialist 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea.  After years of opposition, the Cambodian monarchy bartered a deal for 
Vietnamese removal in 1989.  Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge remained an opposition force and did not partake in 
the elections in the newly formed Kingdom of Cambodia, a constitutional monarchy with the monarchy of 
King Sihanouk.  Privatization commenced between 1989 and 1992, ending the era of collectivism.  See id. 
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population remain largely impoverished and undereducated.3  “The legal 
framework is dismal,” and progress is slow-paced in the vacuum of proper 
governance.4  Despite the presence of political discord, Cambodia’s leaders 
are aware of the environmental problems that accompany modernization and 
expansion.5  In part, this stems from Cambodia’s reliance on its fisheries for 
food, income, and social harmony.  As the country’s population expands, 
demand for its resources increases and development alters the landscape, 
Cambodia must decide how to maintain and support the biodiversity and 
health of its inland fisheries while allowing the country to expand in the 
world market.  
Because the Tonle Sap Basin (“Tonle Sap”)6 is Cambodia’s largest 
source of fish, it stands as an excellent vehicle for addressing the woeful 
gaps in Cambodia’s fishery and environmental laws and policy.  Considered 
the most important fishery in the country,7 the Tonle Sap is an irreplaceable 
social and economic resource.8  Fishing in the Tonle Sap supports both 
domestic subsistence and mid-size fishing,9 while industrial-level export 
continues to increase in its share of the overall catch.  Surrounding countries 
have set their sights not only on fish, but also on the hydroelectric and 
timber potential of the Tonle Sap.10  Although the Tonle Sap is still a viable 
fishery, without proper legal reform, increased agency coordination and 
                                           
3
 See Rebecca Povarchuk, Cambodia’s WTO Accession: A Strenuous but Necessary Step for a Poor 
Nation Seeking Economic Prosperity, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 645 (2004).  This is a decidedly positive 
review of Cambodia’s entry into the WTO. 
4
 Sith Samath et al, Addressing Anarchy: Decentralisation and Natural Resource Management in 
Ratanakiri Province, Upland Cambodia, in INSTITUTIONS, LIVELIHOODS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CHANGE 
AND RESPONSE IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 367 (Andrea Straub ed., 2001). 
5
 Recognition of the environmental problems facing Cambodia can be seen in a host of laws and 
regulations, including the Constitution, the Environmental Laws, the new Forestry Law, the International 
Wetlands agreement, and the designation of the Tonle Sap as a UNESCO Protected Biosphere.   
6
 The Tonle Sap Basin refers to the areas of the Tonle Sap River at its confluence with the Mekong 
River. 
7
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE TONLE SAP BASIN STRATEGY (2005).  Seventy-five percent 
of Cambodians rely almost entirely on fish for protein.  See Mlup Baitong, Cambodia Environment Fact 
and Information, http://www.mlup.org/www.mlup.orgenglish/mlup%20baitong/Cam-face.html (last visited 
May 12, 2006). 
8
 See Steven Sanderson, The Future of Conservation, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 162.   
9
 See Draft Fisheries Law (2001) (Cambodia), available at http://www.maff.gov.kh/ 
pdf/DraftFisheriesLaw.pdf. 
10
 China has proposed damming key tributaries to the Tonle Sap, which has direct and proximate 
impact on the health and stability of the fishery.  See Edward Lanfranco, China and the Mekong: A Tale of 
Two Rivers, TERRADAILY, July 6, 2005, http://www.terradaily.com/news/water-earth-05j.html.  Illegal 
Timber trade has similarly destroyed key wetland areas of the Tonle Sap; Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the U.N., For Cambodia’s ‘Great Lake’ and the Millions Who Depend on It, A New Lease 
on Life, FAO NEWSROOM, Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/field/2005/107684/index.html. 
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environmental planning, it will likely become a wasteland of 
mismanagement and exploitation.11 
To demonstrate the lack of legal and administrative control over the 
Tonle Sap, this Comment examines the frail legal regime that currently fails 
to project a sustainable future for the fishery.  Part II gives a brief summary 
of the geography, history, land use, and fishery practices in and on the Tonle 
Sap.  Part III presents the theory of sustainability and summarizes the laws 
governing the Tonle Sap, including the Draft Fisheries Law.  Part IV gives a 
detailed legal analysis of the fishery and related laws, highlighting the gaps, 
loopholes, and policy failures in the current and proposed legal regimes.  
Lastly, Part V provides a recommendation for changes within the 
Cambodian legal regime, by comparing the Cambodian method of fishery 
governance to other sustainable fisheries systems.12  
II. CAMBODIA AT THE CROSSROADS: INCREASING POPULATION, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMAND PLACE THE TONLE SAP IN A PERILOUS 
POSITION 
Like many Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia has begun to 
modernize and integrate with world markets.  At the same time, Cambodia’s 
lands are largely undeveloped and contain delicately balanced, yet rich 
natural resources.  Thus, Cambodia sits at a junction from which it can either 
pursue an environmentally sustainable path, or careen down one of short-
term profits and long-term disappointment.  Nowhere is this dilemma more 
apparent than around the Tonle Sap.  As Southeast Asia’s largest freshwater 
lake and basin, the Tonle Sap is home to an incredible amount of animal life.  
These living resources are the major source of food and labor for over one 
million Cambodians.13  Yet because of the relatively new systems of private 
land tenure, international export of fish, and privately operated forestry 
practices, this natural resource remains in perilous straits.  Unprotected 
forests, poor scientific study, and outdated laws all contribute to these 
problems.  Despite these threats, Cambodia is in a position to remedy this 
situation.  To understand why Cambodia is well placed to create reasonable 
                                           
11
 See Trade and Environmental Database, TED Case Studies: Lake Victoria, 
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/VICTORIA.HTM (last visited May 8, 2006).  Lake 
Victoria is an excellent example of poor management decisions, over-fishing, and pollution leading to the 
demise of a powerful inland fishery; it is a model Cambodia must not emulate. 
12
 Specific attention will be paid to the Celilo Falls Fishery on the Columbia River in the 
Northwestern United States, now buried behind the Dalles Dam. 
13
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUMMARY OF INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT FOR TONLE SAP 
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT IN CAMBODIA 3 (2005). 
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and workable set of laws for the Tonle Sap’s sustainable future, it is 
necessary to understand the current uses and demands on the Tonle Sap.  
A. The Tonle Sap Basin’s Unique Hydrology Supports Millions of People 
and an Unparalleled Diversity of Fish, Birds, and Mammals 
The Tonle Sap’s internationally renowned biodiversity is rooted in its 
unique hydrology.14  During the dry season the Tonle Sap covers an area of 
merely 2,500 square kilometers, but during the rainy season it swells up to 
10,000-16,000 square kilometers.15   When flooded, the Tonle Sap takes up 
roughly 44% of the total area of Cambodia.16 Nearly 60% of the basin’s 
waters flow from the Mekong River.17  The hydrologic cycle of dry and wet 
seasons helps replenish nutrients, increase spawning areas and expand 
fishing access for Cambodians.  However, this replenishment depends on the 
health and existence of inundated forests.18  The roots of these trees trap 
nutrients, filter the water, and create spawning habitat.19   Moreover, during 
the rainy season, fish thrive on newly available nutrients in deep inland 
rivers.20  The flood cycle also means that activities in the floodplain have a 
direct effect on the water quality of the Tonle Sap.21  Activities such as 
logging loosen sediment, increase siltation of the basin, and introduce 
residual chemicals into the water when the Basin floods.22  Flood season also 
brings human and chemical waste into the Tonle Sap from downstream cities 
on the Mekong, especially from Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s largest city.23   
Because of this rejuvenating hydrology, the Tonle Sap is also home to 
a rich array of human and animal life.  The rainy season backflow creates 
unique habitat that supports fish, birds, buffalo, and humans.24  Although 
                                           
14
 See United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Man and Biosphere 
Programme, Biosphere Reserve Information: Tonle Sap, http://www2.unesco.org/mab/br/brdir/directory/ 
biores.asp?mode=all&code=CAM+01 (last visited May 8, 2006).   
15
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 1.  
16
 Id. at 1. 
17
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 13, at 5. 
18
 See id.; see also Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9; JOSEPH KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, (2d ed. 2002) (stating the general importance of wetlands to the health and 
biodiversity of fisheries).   
19
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 13, at 10. 
20
 Id. 
21
 See OLIVIER SERRAT, THREATS TO THE TONLE SAP 2 (2005), available at http://www.adb.org/ 
Projects/Tonle_Sap/Speeches/threats-tonle-sap.pdf. 
22
 World Lakes Network, Experience and Lessons Learned Brief for Tonle Sap, Jan. 20, 2004, at 7, 
http://www.worldlakes.org/uploads/Tonle_Sap_Brief_20Jan04.pdf. 
23
 See generally David Lague, Water Crisis Shows China’s Pollution Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 
2005, at A6. 
24
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA FOR 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TONLE SAP BASIN MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION II, at 1 (2004). 
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studies are only beginning to explore the depth and breadth of this fishery, 
its importance is unquestioned.25  Estimates indicate that from 200 to over 
800 species of fish, including the rare, giant catfish,26 inhabit the Tonle 
Sap.27   Migratory birds from Southeast Asia also make use of the Tonle Sap, 
while crocodiles, birds,28 deer, and buffalo roam its shores and 45 different 
habitats.29  Equally as important, over one million people, roughly 32% of 
the total Cambodian population,30 rely on this fishery.  The Tonle Sap 
provides food and income, as well as social, cultural, and political stability.  
Despite the rich biological resources of the Tonle Sap, however, between 40 
and 60% of the households bordering it are below the official poverty line.31 
B. Current Fishing Practices on the Tonle Sap 
There is increasing awareness of the economic, social, and political 
importance of the Tonle Sap and the legal inadequacy of the Fisheries Law 
to protect future fish stocks.  Fishing in the Tonle Sap produces nearly 
230,000 tons of fish annually, which supports roughly one million 
Cambodians each year.  Economically, this produces around $150-200 
million a year, of which 25% comes from exports.32  The Tonle Sap actually 
reaches into Thailand and is regarded by neighboring countries as a vital 
natural resource.33 
                                           
25
 See E. Baran & T.A. Jantunen, WorldFish Center, A Bayesian Model of the Fish Production in the 
Tonle Sap Great Lake, Cambodia (2004), http://www.worldefishcenter.org/projects/bayfish/Baran_ 
Jantunen_2004_Stakeholders_consultation_for_Bayesian_DSS.pdf (describing the importance of flooded 
networks generally); Stefan Lovgren, Saving the Big Fish: Zeb Hogan Is Hooked on Rescuing the Catfish 
of Cambodia from Oblivion, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Jan. 21, 2006, at 3. 
26
 Lovgren, supra note 25; see also Michael Sullivan, Tonle Sap: The Flowing Heart of Cambodia 
(National Public Radio, Morning Edition broadcast Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5039980; see also Kultida Samabuddhi & Theerawat Khamthita, Giant 
Catfish Hunt Faces Extinction, BANGKOK POST (Thailand), May 2, 2005, (describing the deleterious effects 
of hunting giant catfish).  
27
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, PROPOSED ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND GRANT KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA: TONLE SAP 
SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT, at v (2005).  This survey suggests that there had once been 500 
species of fish, but that over 300 of them have disappeared from the Tonle Sap. 
28
 Karen J. Coates, Plan Helps Birds, Villagers Thrive in Cambodia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 
16, 2006, at 16 (describing attempts to stop bird hunting and egg poaching in Prek Toal, next to the Tonle 
Sap).  
29
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK supra note 7, at 8. 
30
 Id. at 1. 
31
 Id. at ii. 
32
 Id. at 1.  The majority of the fish are exported to Thailand. 
33
 Concern over the health of the Tonle Sap and Mekong River helped create the inter-governmental 
Mekong River Commission, which coordinates and proposes legislation and provides scientific monitoring 
of the inland waterways.  See Mekong River Commission, Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, Apr. 5, 1995, available at 
http://www.mrcmekong.org/agreement_95/ agreement_95.htm. 
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Unfortunately, the current fishing system in place on the Tonle Sap 
provides for only a modicum of order and restraint.  Access to the Tonle Sap 
for fishing is governed by the 1987 Fisheries Law,34 which divides inland 
fishery access into publicly auctioned lots and an open access system.35  Lot 
ownership is favored over open access because it gives the lot owner a 
limited lease to fish the entire lot area, while in the open access areas, where 
few regulations exist, fishermen must stake out the best areas and fight off 
other fishermen.  Because of this confusion, many try to live as close as 
possible to the best fishing areas, even building houses on stilts over these 
spots.36  This lack of equal access rights gives rise to frequent, violent 
clashes between lot owners and open access users.37  Further “anarchy in the 
fisheries sector” 38 includes the use of samras, a fishing method of using tree 
branches placed in the water to concentrate and harvest fish using seine nets, 
occupation of water without permits, and illegal catching of pangasius 
fingerlings.39  
Responding to the increased need for order that the old laws do not 
provide, the Cambodian Fisheries Department has implemented two five-
year “Fisheries Sector Development Plan[s].”40  In addition, the government 
recently made all capture of giant catfish illegal.41  The government has also 
attempted to separate the fishery users into three categories: 1) community-
based fishers; 2) mid-sized fishers; and 3) industrial-sized fishers.42  This is 
                                           
34
 Fiat-Law on Fishery Management and Administration, State Council, No. 33 KRO.CHOR 
(enacted Mar. 9, 1987).   
35
 See  NICOLAAS VAN ZALINGE, MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION FISHERIES PROGRAM, DATA 
REQUIREMENTS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ON THE TONLE SAP, http://www.fao.org/documents/ 
show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/005/ad070e/ad070e0a.htm (last visited May 8, 2006).  Fishing lots are 
auctioned off in a competitive public system for two-year periods and the largest lots are nearly 500 square 
kilometers.  Lot owners are allowed to harvest at the maximum levels designated by the MAFF.  See ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 35. 
36
 VAN ZALINGE, supra note 35.  Often Cambodians build houses on stilts to ensure being nearest the 
water even during flooded seasons. 
37
 MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FORESTRY, REPORT ON “THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES AND 
ACTION PLAN OF GOOD GOVERNANCE” IN FISHERIES SECTOR 1-2 (2002), available at 
http://www.maff.gov.kh/pdf/CamfishGAP.PDF. 
38
 Id. at 3. 
39
 Id. at 4. 
40
 DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, SECOND FIVE-YEAR FISHERIES SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2000-
2005, at 1-5 (2001), available at http://www.maff.gov.kh/pdf/5-yearplan0105eng.pdf (English translation 
on official website). 
41
 Lovgren, supra note 25, at 3. 
42
 See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9. 
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part of an effort to give subsistence fishermen and their families a protected 
community-based fishery, off-limits to other users.43  
C. Cambodia’s Increasing Population, Growing Market Share, and 
Erratic Land Use Strain Its Natural Resources 
As Cambodia’s population and industrial activity increases, the 
divergence between big cities and rural areas has grown.44  Economic 
activity has consistently increased over the past fifteen years.  The 
population, too, has increased rapidly with 43% of Cambodians below 
fifteen years of age.45  While Phnom Penh has benefited from the increased 
economic activity, the rural areas, which contain the largest populations, 
have seen little improvement.  Indeed, as much as eighty percent of 
Cambodia’s rural population lives in poverty.46  Literacy rates are low, and 
lack of news and political information is pervasive throughout these areas.47   
While the influx of money and interest from abroad has benefited 
Cambodia’s economy, the country has overburdened infrastructure 
development.48  Even though roughly 75% of the population works in 
agriculture, more young people are moving into the cities for factory work.49  
The increase in the cities’ populations stresses basic sanitation and access to 
housing.  As a consequence, more housing is being created in a vacuum of 
planning and basic sewerage systems.50  As Cambodia’s biggest city, Phnom 
Penh’s disorderly expansion has a direct impact on the Tonle Sap.  When the 
Mekong reverses51 it transports waste back into the Tonle Sap.52  Thus, 
                                           
43
 See Meredith A. Giordano, Managing the Quality of International Rivers: Global Principles and 
Basin Practice, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 111 (2003).  The author gives a general overview of practices on 
large river basins and suggests the need for water quality institutions. 
44
 Cambodia’s population as of 2003 was expanding at a rate of 2.3%, and the population was nearly 
14 million in 2005.  See DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, supra note 40, at 2. 
45
 Id. at 2.  Population is projected to be 14 million by 2005. 
46
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 1, 5. 
47
 See id.; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, CAMBODIA INTER-CENSAL POPULATION 
SURVEY (CIPS) 2004: WOMEN IN CAMBODIA, available at http://www.nis.gov.kh/SURVEYS/depthcips04/ 
wc_cips/summary_wc.htm. 
48
 JOHN DENNIS, A REVIEW OF NATIONAL SOCIAL POLICIES: CAMBODIA, 
http://www.mekonginfo.org/mrc_en/doclib.nsf/0/2A94925F72E170CBC725682E002A8D30/$FILE/FULL
TEXT.html (last visited June 17, 2006) 
49
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 7. 
50
 Karen A. Tramontano, Stitching Up Global Labor Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2004, at A23, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56426-2004Dec10.html. 
51
 The Mekong floods and reverses direction once annually.  See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE 
MEKONG PEOPLE 12 (2004), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/GMS/2004/gms-
people.pdf. 
52
 Tom Fawthrop, The Price of Free Trade—Part II: The End of Textile Export Quotas Cushion May 
Confront Cambodia with the Hard Realities of the Global Marketplace, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, Oct.1, 
2004, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4627. 
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proper planning is required to make this population transition ultimately 
beneficial to all Cambodians in the years to come. 
As the cities expand, the rural areas have seen little improvement.  
Poor education is a predominant characteristic of people on the Tonle Sap, 
especially among women.53  There is also a lack of medical access, although 
Cambodia is responding by implementing non-profit medical care.54  These 
problems are amplified on the Tonle Sap, where access to medical care, 
education, and information are limited.55  The Basin’s relative isolation has 
also created difficulties in implementing fishery and forestry management 
policy.56  Moreover, damming of the lower Mekong will put these 
populations at further risk due to reduced water flow and fish habitat.57 
Further, the confusion created by Cambodia’s relatively new system of 
private land tenure58 has exacerbated poor land use planning on the Tonle 
Sap.  On the one hand, private land ownership has lead to unchecked and 
erratic construction in critical areas on the Tonle Sap, increasing 
sedimentation and decreasing points of access.59  On the other hand, the new 
land laws have created confusion for much of the rural poor regarding land 
titles and boundary resolution.60  Many people simply have no concept or 
desire to title land they have always used.  However, those who do not title 
their land face the possibility of losing it to the government.61  Moreover, 
with the increase in population, clashes have grown over competition for 
owning land.62  Lastly, tension between ethnic Vietnamese and native Khmer 
peoples has increased due to uneven land titling and resource exploitation.63 
                                           
53
 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STATISTICS, 1998 LITERACY CENSUS OF CAMBODIA, available at 
http://www.nis.gov.kh/CENSUSES/Census1998/literacy.htm. 
54
 Celia W. Dugger, Cambodia Tries Nonprofit Path to Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006. 
55
 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 5. 
56
 See DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, supra note 40, at 1-4. 
57
 See Piyaporn Wongruang, Study Planned for Two Dams, BANGKOK POST (Thail.), Oct. 4, 2005. 
58
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, LAND ACQUISITION AND RESETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
TONLE SAP SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS PROJECT (2005), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/ 
Resettlement_Plans/CAM/LARF-TSS.pdf. 
59
 See MOK MARETH ET AL., BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ON THE TONLE SAP 
WATERSHED: THE TONLE SAP BIOSPHERE RESERVE (2001), available at http://www.earthscape.org/r1/ 
cbs01/cbs01a13aa.html. 
60
 See Cambodia Center for Human Rights, Police Killed 5 in Poipet: A Case of Violent Land 
Evictions, First Quarterly Report at 17-20 (2005). 
61
 See Joanne Pawlowski, Forced Evictions of Cambodia’s Poor, HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNE, vol. 11, 
n.3 (2005), http://www.hri.ca/tribune/onlineissue/V11-3-2005/Evictions_in_Cambodia.html. 
62
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 2.   
63
 Although many of the “ethnic Vietnamese” were born in Cambodia, there nonetheless exists 
tension and animosity with those with “full” Khmer nationality.  See id. at 6. 
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III. THE LAWS GOVERNING THE TONLE SAP: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT 
LAND, FORESTRY AND FISHERY LAWS 
Given the unique hydrology and sheer size of the Tonle Sap, the 
Forestry and Land Use laws have almost as large an impact as the Fishery 
Laws.  Because the new laws ought to create sustainable practices, a brief 
description of the theory and an example of sustainable resource 
management will precede an examination of the historical and legal 
developments of the land use, fishery, and forestry laws. 
A. The Sustainability Theory Contributes Several Basic Factors to Be 
Considered in Any Legal Framework 
The word “sustainability” has specific meaning in the context of 
resource management.  Sustainability refers to a type of control of a 
common-pool resource (“CPR”) to prevent its destruction and maintain its 
long-term productivity.64  Elinor Ostrom, an expert on the governance of 
common pool resources, suggests five elements of a sustainable fishery: 1) 
clear property rights; 2) collective choice governance; 3) close monitoring; 
4) clear sanctions; and 5) dispute-resolution capacity.65  While existence of 
these five factors66 is only prima facie evidence of a sustainable fishery, 
nearly all successful fisheries possess these characteristics.67  The five 
elements function in concert, preventing overuse caused by self-interested 
users maximizing personal profit at the expense of the common resource.68 
Larger fisheries require coercion or a “special device” because “rational self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group 
interests.”69  Creating fishery laws with these five elements in mind helps to 
avoid the tragedy of the commons70 and to establish sustainable fishery 
                                           
64
 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (1990). 
65
 Id. at 2, 3, 5.  
66
 Gregory Maggio suggests a reduced three critical elements for sustainable resources:  1) 
“recognizing resource access rights and security for local communities; [2)] enabling local communities to 
participate effectively in resource management decisions under the regimes; and [3)] requiring equitable 
sharing with local communities of benefits arising out of the use of natural resources.”  G. F. Maggio, 
Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in International Legal Instruments for Conserving 
Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179, 180 (1998). 
67
 Cf. JOSEPH C. DUPRIS ET AL., THE SI’LAILO WAY: INDIANS, SALMON AND LAW ON THE COLUMBIA 
RIVER 15 (2006). 
68
 OSTROM, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing the tragedy of the commons in general). 
69
 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 2 (1965) (emphasis removed). 
70
 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 162.  This is a 
seminal work on the tragedy that ensues when users of a common-pool resource seek to further their 
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management.71  At the same time, one must bear in mind the relentless and 
deeply historical aspects of over-fishing.72 
An example of the successful application of Ostrom’s five factors can 
be found at the Celilo Falls fishery, on the Columbia River, Oregon.73  In 
1934, Warm Springs, Umatilla, and Yakima Indians created the Celilo 
Fishery Committee (“Committee”) to manage salmon fishing on at Celilo 
Falls.74  Although the Indians had the technology to over-fish, they chose a 
markedly divergent, sustainable path instead.75  The Committee represented 
nearly all the Indians who had a property right derived from treaties with the 
U.S. to fish at the “usual and accustomed”76 places along the Dalles and 
Columbia Rivers.77  The Committee created its own bylaws by means of 
discussion and collective action.78  Moreover, the rules were enforced by 
imposing sanctions on members who failed to meet the community’s 
expectations.79  Given the nature of fishing with dip-nets80 on shared 
                                                                                                                              
individual goals and needs at the expense of the resource itself.  Hardin demonstrates the tragedy of the 
commons by reference to herdsmen, who each rationally seeks to maximize his herd on a common plot of 
land.  For each added animal, the herdsman gains one unit of value, but the cost of over-grazing by having 
more animals is shared by everyone.  This externalization of negative costs leads to more and more animals 
being added until the resource itself cannot support any of the animals and the herders thus kill off the 
common resource.  This situation has repeated itself in many arenas, not just environmental ones. 
71
 See Tundi Agardy, An Environmentalist’s Perspective on Responsible Fisheries: The Need for 
Holistic Approaches, presented at Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem 
(Oct. 1-4, 2001), available at http://www.fao.org/fi/meetings/Reykjavik/default.asp.  Agardy presents the 
model of cooperative management strategies that involve all users to insure long-lasting fisheries. 
72
 See JEREMY JACKSON ET AL., HISTORICAL OVERFISHING AND THE RECENT COLLAPSE OF COASTAL 
ECOSYSTEMS, SCIENCE, July 27, 2001; see also Cornelia Dean, About the Oceans, He Says Firmly, 
Attention Must Be Paid, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2005, at F2.  The realist’s view is that over-fishing is simply 
inescapable. 
73
 The installation of a dam on the Dalles River effectively killed off the Celilo Falls fishery in 1957.  
However, before the arrival of the dam, fishing practices were consummately sustainable, as defined by 
Ostrom’s five-factors.  DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 18. 
74
 See id. 
75
 See id. at 339-360.  While they had the ability to over-fish, they thought of the future generations’ 
need to fish and subsequently limited their take.  Sampson Tulee’s will encapsulates the Indians’ 
sustainable vision for the Columbia.  In his will, he gave his interests in the fishery to his children and their 
children in perpetuity: in fee tail.  Id. at 20.  Indeed, it was the over-fishing and damming activity of the 
newcomer Europeans and Chinese that destroyed this fishery. 
76
 Id. at 109-110.  This was the treaty language used to guarantee tribal fishing rights. 
77
 Id. at 200-201. 
78
 Id. at 215-217. 
79
 Id. at 208-09.  Pensus B. “Peanuts” Finley was the only person the Committee excluded from 
Celilo, given his generally unwelcome demeanor.  Tom Nye was also sanctioned (his fish were confiscated 
and he was excluded from the best platforms) because he not only broke the ban on night fishing, but he 
broke another’s dip net.  Id. 
80
 Id. at 11-17.  A dip-net is a long pole with a net on the end, used to capture salmon migrating up 
through rivers especially in turbulent water.  One would dip the pole deep in the water and salmon were 
easily plucked from the water. 
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platforms, close monitoring was conducted by the fishery’s own users.81  
The Committee also served as the vehicle for resolving disputes between 
users.82  Most importantly, members of the Committee were also users of the 
resource and had a stake in its perpetual existence.83  The Celilo Falls fishery 
is an important example of possibility of a sustainable fishery and the 
strength of Ostrom’s five-factor analysis. 
B. The Evolution of the Land Use Laws Reflect a Transition from 
Socialism to Privatization 
Cambodia’s private property ownership regime is a recent 
development, reflecting not only its socialist past, but also the confusion 
wrought by its post-colonial transition.  Even after Pol Pot lost power in 
1979, the notion of private property did not reappear until 1989.84  Indeed, in 
1979, the Khmer Rouge’s successors, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea 
(“PRK”), established a system of collective ownership whereby private 
ownership rules were based merely on occupancy and no true private title 
existed.85  With another change of government in 1989 that created the State 
of Cambodia, the government established limited private land tenure.86  At 
the same time, the State of Cambodia did not recognize any traditional rights 
to the land. 
A major step toward formal and complex land ownership rights 
occurred when the recently formed Kingdom of Cambodia87 set out a new 
system of land laws in 1992.88  With 227 articles, the Land Law of 1992 
                                           
81
 Id. at 204. 
82
 Id. at 215-217. 
83
 See id. at 20.  Had the Dalles Dam not been built and fishing controlled by Indian laws, the fishery 
would likely still exist today. 
84
 See John Dennis, supra note 48. 
85
 Indira Simbolon, Access to Land of Highland Indigenous Minorities: The Case of Plural Property 
Rights in Cambodia, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers, Working Paper No. 42 
(2002), at 13. 
86
 Id. at 14.  Three types of ownership were created:  (1) private ownership around homes under 
2000 square meters; (2) usufruct rights to state owned plots of less than 5 hectares; and (3) concession 
rights to expand agricultural areas larger than 5 hectares. 
87
 See Malcom Falkus & Stephen Frost, Labour Relations and Regulations in Cambodia: Theory and 
Practice, Working Papers Series No. 38, City University of Hong Kong (2002), at 2-3, available at 
http://www.cityu.edu.hk/searc/WP38_02_FalkusFrost_Full.pdf.  The Kingdom of Cambodia is a 
constitutional monarchy, with King Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Varaman serving much like the English 
monarchs, allowing Parliament to do much of the legislative work.  Parliament is bicameral, with most 
power being in the National Assembly, though a Senate exists.  There is also an independent judiciary with 
a Supreme Court.   
88
 Land Law of 1992, Kret-Chbab/100 (enacted on Aug. 10, 1992). 
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created general rules of private property ownership.89  Despite the apparent 
transparency of these laws, their creation resulted in uneven distribution of 
property and surreptitious land grabbing by the government.90  The Land 
Law of 1992 permitted the government to prey on the ignorance of citizens 
and eject those who merely did not follow a new procedure to title land. 91  
Use of force was not uncommon in ejecting tenants.92  These actions sparked 
international debate.93 
Subsequently, the Land Law of 2001 was created and appears to have 
rectified many of the problems inherent in the Land Law of 1992.94  For 
example, it establishes protection for public lands and ecological reserves.95  
However, complaints of discretionary abuses remain, and the cadastral 
process of boundary disputes remains extremely slow due to the 
overwhelming number of disputes.96  Land grabbing continues.97  In 
addition, a clause in Article 12 of the Land Law of 2001 provides the state 
with a reversionary interest98 in all lands.99  This flexible standard allows the 
government to appropriate lands for any “reasonable” public use if the users 
                                           
89
 See id.  The eight types of land ownership are: 1) estate ownership; 2) temporary possession; 3) 
ownership dismemberment; 4) real-estate secured transactions; 5) succession; 6) sale of real estate; 7) 
rights conservation of the estate; and 8) regulation of real estate. 
90
 King Delivers Justice in Ratanakiri Land Case, Legal Aid of Cambodia Quarterly, May 2002, 1-4; 
see also Pawlowski, supra note 61.   
91
 Land Law of 1992, supra note 88, art. I (stating that all land in Cambodia belongs to the state). 
92
 Legal Aid of Cambodia, Officials Use Cancelled Land Titles to Lease Land, LEGAL AID OF 
CAMBODIA Q., Feb. 2003, at 5-6, http://www.lac.org.kh/final_quarterly_newslater_feb_2003.pdf. 
93
 See generally Shaun Williams, Review of Current and Proposed Cambodian Land Legislation, 
OXFAM Cambodia Land Study Project (May 1999), available at http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/ 
Land/Docs/draftlandlaw/review_of_current_and_proposed_Cambodian_landlegislation.htm.  Given the 
drafting flaws and abuses that resulted, domestic and international NGOs heavily criticized the Land Law 
of 1992, spurring legislative action.   
94
 Land Law of 2001, art. 4 (Cambodia), available at http://www.gocambodia.com/laws/pdf/LAW-
01-Land%20Law-E.pdf (official law in Khmer). 
95
 Id. art. 11; see also William Chapman, “The Best Laid Schemes  . . .”: Land-Use Planning and 
Historic Preservation in Cambodia, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529 (1998). 
96
 Legal Aid of Cambodia, Annual Report 2001, ch. 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.lac.org.kh/annual_report_2001.htm; see also Alyssa A. Vegter, Forsaking the Forests for the 
Trees: Forestry Law in Papau New Guinea Inhibits Indigenous Customary Ownership, 14 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 545 (2005) (describing the similarly slow process of settling indigenous land disputes in Papua 
New Guinea). 
97
 Guy De Launey, Cambodia ‘Suffering Land Crisis,’ BBC NEWS, Sept. 2, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4207138.stm 
98
 A reversionary interest is an interest in land that will revert to the grantor when the current owner 
dies or gives up her interest in the property at issue.  See Joseph William Singer, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, 572 (3d ed. 2002). 
99
 “The State is the owner of the properties in the territory of the Kingdom of Cambodia . . . and of 
all properties that are escheat, or that are voluntarily given to the State by their owners, or that have not 
been subject to due and proper private appropriation or that are not presently being privately occupied in 
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 4 of this law.”  Land Law of 2001, supra note 94, art. 12 
(emphasis added). 
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fail to register properly the land.  Arguably, Article 44 of the Constitution 
should govern Article 12, making such an escheat100 subject to public policy 
considerations.  However, no explicit reference is made in the Land Law and 
the link remains vague at best.101  
Moreover, the Land Law does not explicitly reference sustainable use 
or development of lands, especially those bordering inland fisheries.  
Concessions102 generally are available for “social and economic purposes,” 
but there is no formal system of granting lands for fishing.103  Rather, the 
only major land laws that refer to fishing access are a 1989 Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (“MAFF”) proclamation creating fishing 
lots, and a 1993 proclamation of protected areas (including the Tonle Sap).104  
Thus, the 2001 Land Law sets few limits on the scope of development in and 
around the Tonle Sap Basin. 
C. The Forestry Law Projects an Honest Attempt at Conservation and 
Sustainable Management, but Creates Loopholes Regarding Fishery 
Protection 
Given the Tonle Sap’s unique hydrology and interplay with 
surrounding forest and agricultural lands, the Forestry Law has a major 
impact on the Tonle Sap.105  In 2002, a new set of Forestry Laws was 
adopted, creating a new legal regime focused on sustainable use of 
Cambodia’s limited forest reserves.106  The law’s sustainable mission 
appears directly in the preamble.107  This language responds to the 
destructive and erratic logging practices that persisted under prior laws and 
                                           
100
 A reversion of property to the state where the owner dies without heirs or the property is 
abandoned.  Here, abandonment can be found if the property is not properly titled.  See SINGER ET AL., 
supra note 98, at 561. 
101
 See id.  
102
 A concession is defined as:  “A government grant for specific privileges.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 307 (8th ed. 2004).  
103
 Land Law of 2001, supra note 94. 
104
 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 1989 Proclamation of the Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (1989); see also Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Regulations on the 
Creation and Designation of Protected Areas (1993). 
105
 See Andy Weiner, Comment, The Forest and the Trees: Sustainable Development and Human 
Rights in the Context of Cambodia, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2003) (offering a general summary of the 
forestry laws and status of sustainable forestry practice in Cambodia). 
106
 See Forestry Law, adopted Aug. 2002, at pmbl., available at http://www.maff.gov.kh/pdf/ 
ForestryLaw.pdf (unedited translation). 
107
 This law defines the framework for management, harvesting, use, development, and reservation of 
the forests in the Kingdom of Cambodia.  Pursuant to the National Forest policy, the principle objective of 
this Law is to ensure, for present and future generations, the sustainable management of these forests for 
their social, economic and environmental benefits.  Id. ch. 1, art. 1. 
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the system of uneven concession granting.108  Indeed, since the 1990s, due in 
part to illegal logging,109 Cambodia has lost ten percent of its forest cover, 
representing a reduction from 13 million hectares to 11.2 million hectares.110  
The Forestry Law centralizes control over concession granting in the 
MAFF.111  Additional legislation creates limits and clarifies the requirements 
for concessions.112 
The Forestry Law’s goal of sustainability relies upon establishing the 
permanent forest estate,113 a protective boundary that can extend to all 
forests, public and private.  Thus, there is a permanently protected forest, 
off-limits to logging, and another that is open to regulated logging.  Within 
the public forests, termed the permanent forest reserve, concessions and 
logging activities are subject to strict management, with broad commands 
for sustainability.114  While some of the language remains vague and broad,   
sub-decrees have been and will be established to make more specific 
commands.115  The Forestry Law also makes use of centralized command 
and control authority in MAFF.116  
While the Forestry Law addresses animal management and 
regulation,117 it exempts all fish and aquatic life from its scope.118  Moreover, 
the law does not explicitly address inundated forests, which are key to the 
health of the Tonle Sap.  Further, the only regulation related to sedimentation 
                                           
108
 David Lyon, Battling Cambodia’s Illegal Timber Trade, BBC NEWS, May 16, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1989847.stm.  Concessions granted for forestry practices 
include the limited right to harvest timber, however, the MAFF has control over the scope of these 
concessions.  See Weiner, supra note 105, at 1546. 
109
 See Jennifer Lynn Peters, Land and Resource Management: The Illegal Trafficking of Timber in 
Cambodia, 1999 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 102 (1999). 
110
 See Phillip Hirsch, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Underlying Causes of 
Deforestation in the Mekong Region (1999), available at http://www.iges.or.jp/en/fc/phase1/3ws-20-
hirsch.pdf; see also Heather Wolf, Deforestation in Cambodia and Malaysia: The Case for an International 
Legal Solution, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 429, 431 (1996).  Concessions under the new Forestry Law refer 
to “a contract between the State and a concessionaire for the harvest rights to timber products and NTFPs 
from a designated production forest within the permanent forest reserve.”  Forestry Law, supra note 105, 
art. 5(13).  That contract cannot extend beyond thirty years and is terminable by the MAFF.  Id. art 18.  
Fishery concessions differ in that they are a limited grant given by lottery to fisherman and are more a paid-
for license than a contract.  See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 18. 
111
 Forestry Law, supra note 106. 
112 Total laod: declaration (Prakas) No. 527, Dec. 25, 2001; Concession rules: declaration (Prakas) 
No. 5721, Dec. 13, 2001. 
113
 Forestry Laws, supra note 106 at ch. 4.  This includes important areas and critical habitat. 
114
 Id. art. 11 
115
 See MAFF e-Library, http://www.maff.gov.kh/e-library/e-library.html. 
116
 See Organization Chart of MAFF, http://www.maff.gov.kh/structure.html.  MAFF creates 
substantive policy to regulate specific forests with unique management issues. 
117
 Forestry Laws, supra note 106, ch. 10. 
118
 Id. art. 49. 
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refers to mining and excavating activities, not logging.119  Erosion from 
deforestation and farmed land contributes damaging silt to the Tonle Sap, 
reducing its productive capacity.120  This creates a gap in coverage of 
forestry resources with an indirect, yet substantial impact on the fisheries.121  
While it makes sense for gaps in the law to be rectified at the administrative 
level, it puts an unnecessary burden on the MAFF.122  While flexibility and 
discretion can help adapt rigid laws to unique circumstances, too much 
discretion can lead to unplanned and poor management. 
D. The 1987 Fisheries Law Remains Outdated and Fails to Project a 
Vision of Sustainability for the Tonle Sap Basin 
The 1987 Fisheries Law has failed in large part due to its narrow 
scope and emphasis on state-run fish harvesting.  Formed under the socialist 
PRK government, the law gave special rights to “government fishing 
enterprise or solidarity groups which [have] a right to do fishing in the 
fishing lots.”123  That right “must be absolutely respected.”124  This 
concentrates the power of state-run fishing, allowing it to be more expansive 
and free from competition.  However, the law does not actually regulate 
anything more than subsistence and mid-scale fishing.  Consequently, the 
absence of regulation for industrial fishing has proven to be problematic as 
Cambodia has left behind the socialist regime and entered the free market.  
Indeed, the absence of positive law has created loopholes favoring un-
checked exploitation.125   
The authors of the 1987 Fisheries Law also failed to study and plan 
for the current levels of use on the Tonle Sap.  Although available fishery 
catch depends on the amount of water in the lake,126 the actual catch has 
increased at dramatically higher levels.  One study suggests that in 1987 the 
                                           
119
 Id. art. 36(B)(1). 
120
 Janet Larsen, Earth Policy Institute, Disappearing Lakes, Shrinking Seas, Apr. 7, 2005, at 3.   
121
 Even assuming that the Fisheries Law is in place to govern some logging activity that harms the 
Tonle Sap, this type of gap in coverage allows users to skirt around the laws and exploit loopholes. 
122
 See Forestry Law, art. 10(B).  Gaps in the laws appear because the Parliament has created a 
separate set of laws for each sector of the MAFF.  For example, where fisheries come up in the Forestry 
Law, the laws specifically say that “fish and animals that breed in water” are outside the scope of the laws.  
See id. art. 49(A).  Parliament seems to expect MAFF to be able to coordinate and synthesize all of the laws 
to avoid any gaps.  This puts a heavy burden on MAFF.   
123
 Fiat-Law, supra note 34, art. 8. 
124
 Id. 
125
 See Chou Meng Tarr, Learning Across Boundaries on the Greater Mekong Sub-region, Fishing 
Lots and People in Cambodia (2003), http://www.rockmekong.org/pubs/ Year2003/social/13_chou.pdf. 
126
 See E. Baran and T.A. Jantunen, Bayfish—Tonle Sap: A Bayesian Model of the Fish Production in 
the Tonle Sap Great Lake, Cambodia, in MODSIM 2005 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON MODELLING AND 
SIMULATION 2312  (A. Zerger & R.M. Argent eds., 2005). 
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annual catch totaled approximately 60,000 tons, but has since increased to 
nearly 100,000 tons.127  This is especially true of inland aquaculture, which 
the 1987 Fisheries Law limited and made largely contingent on special 
permission.128  As the population and demand for resources increased, the 
1987 Fisheries Law has proven unable to address and protect adequately the 
needs of the Tonle Sap for a sustainable future. 
Much has changed since 1987, and subsequent legislation reflects a 
newfound concern for the Tonle Sap.  For example, in 1995 the MAFF 
implemented new regulations to create better “management and eliminat[e] . 
. .  anarchy in [the] fisheries sector.”129  The regulations attempted to 
decrease the violent territorial clashes between the increasing number of 
mid-sized fishing outfits and smaller individual fishermen.130  
Responding to the 1987 Fisheries Law’s shortcomings, the 
government has authorized two five-year Fisheries Sector Development 
Plans (“Five Year Plan”) drafted by MAFF.  The 1996 Five Year Plan 
marked the first detailed socioeconomic and biologic studies of fishing on 
the Tonle Sap.  The second Five Year Plan has continued adding regulations 
and more survey data.  Recommendations are made for the proper 
management practices to respond to the changes in fish populations and 
habitat and fishing practices.  Both Five Year Plans show particular reliance 
on outside loans, grants, and assistance from such international organizations 
as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.  In addition, a regional 
agreement between Cambodia and its neighbors protects the Mekong.131  
                                           
127
 D. Lamberts, Tonle Sap Fisheries: A Case Study on Floodplain Gillnet Fishing in Siem Reap, 
Cambodia, RAP Publication AB561/E (2001), available at http://www.fao.org/documents/show_ 
cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/004/ab561e/ab561e05.htm. 
128
 See id.; see also, Fiat Law, supra note 34, art. 19.  Since the mid-1990s, however, there has been 
considerable growth in aquaculture production of fish and shrimp to nearly 15,000 tons a year in 2000.  See 
Lamberts, supra note 126. 
129
 DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES, supra note 40, at 2. 
130
 Id.  In 1997, Cambodia designated the Tonle Sap as an international biosphere reserve, pursuant to 
UNESCO and in response to its increasingly recognized international importance.  See United Nations 
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supra note 14.  Moreover, the Asian Development Bank 
has loaned millions to help stabilize and expand the fishing practices on the Tonle Sap, following up on this 
UNESCO designation.  See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7. 
131
 Darren Posey, Defining Interest: The Mekong River Commission, J. INT’L POL’Y SOLUTIONS, Feb. 
17, 2005, available at http://www-irps.ucsd.edu/IPS/Defining%20Interests%20The%20Mekong% 
20River%20Commission.pdf.  “The MRC’s mandate is to support and coordinate the sustainable 
development of the Lower Mekong River Basin (LMRB), which runs through [Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, and Thailand].  However, the MRC was designed without the ability to coerce its members or punish 
violators of its policies.  For this reason, realists have often maligned the MRC as an example of yet 
another ineffectual international regime.”  Id. 
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The Mekong River Commission (“MRC”) embodies a multi-national effort 
to develop sustainable practices throughout the Mekong River Basin.132 
In addition to the Five Year Plans, the Draft Fisheries Law of 2001 
(“Draft Fisheries Law”) proposes a much tighter nexus of protective laws 
aimed at building sustainable regulations of fishery practices for inland and 
marine fish exploitation.133  The law reflects the expansion of private fishing 
outfits, especially industrial ones.  At the same time, the law gives special 
rights to family-scale production in order to protect subsistence fishing 
practices on the Tonle Sap and inland waterways.134  Further, the law creates 
broader protections from encroachment for flood-inundated forests.135  The 
1987 Fisheries Law states only that “chopping, reclaiming or firing [sic] the 
inundated forest” is prohibited, whereas the Draft Fisheries Law establishes 
a protected area around all inundated forests, calling for conservation and 
replanting.136  While this Comment explores the drafting flaws and policy 
errors in the Draft Fisheries Laws, it should be noted that the Draft Laws 
provide a comparatively strong alternative to the 1987 Fisheries Law. 
IV. COVERAGE GAPS, LOOPHOLES AND DRAFTING DEFECTS: THE LEGAL 
INADEQUACIES OF THE LAWS CURRENTLY GOVERNING THE TONLE SAP 
Cambodia’s current legal regime for its fisheries fails to meet the 
broad policy goal of sustainability and fails to create strong, justified legal 
standards.  The laws themselves lack clear definitions, transparency and 
proper enforcement mechanisms.  This section examines the shortcomings 
of the laws at play on the Tonle Sap.  First, the current and draft Fisheries 
Laws fail to meet the Cambodian Constitution’s limits and requirements.  
Second, the Draft Fisheries Law places unwise discretion in the minister of 
MAFF, while failing to prevent adverse land use.  Lastly, in light of the 
limited scope of the water pollution laws, the current and draft Fisheries 
Laws fail to make agricultural activity subject to either law, thus, allowing 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides to enter the Tonle Sap.  
                                           
132
 See Mekong River Commission, supra note 33; see also Adam S. Rix, The Mekong River Basin: A 
Resource at the Cross-Roads of Sustainable Development, 21 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 103 (2003); see 
also Brian Shanahan, Agreement for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 8 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 496 (1996). 
133
 See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9.  This has yet to be adopted, although a version has 
circulated through Parliament. 
134
 Id. art. 15. 
135
 Id. arts. 33, 34. 
136
 Fiat Law, supra note 34, art. 18(d); Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, arts. 33, 34. 
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A. The Current Fishery Laws Fail to Meet the Strictures of the 1993 
Constitution 
Cambodia’s most recent Constitution establishes broad environmental 
conservation goals that the 1987 Fisheries Law fails to meet.  Specifically, 
the 1993 Constitution proclaims that: 
The State shall protect the environment and balance of 
abundant natural resources and establish a precise plan of 
management of [natural] resources.137 
A close reading of the 1987 Fisheries Law reveals that it fails to establish 
any “precise plan” for management and “protect the environment.”138   
The 1987 Fisheries Law lacks a comprehensive or “precise” plan of 
management.  Whereas the Draft Fisheries Law sets out a preamble 
projecting the conservation and management goals of the laws, the 1987 
Fisheries Law fails to announce any sort of environmental conservation 
plan.139  While one can ascertain a program of action, it is negatively stated, 
with no orderly arrangement of an overall objective that can be easily 
distinguished and applied.  The law haphazardly explains where and what 
types of fishing are allowed, and how the penalties for violations of the law 
can be assessed and enforced.  It fails to establish a means of creating a total 
allowable catch,140 and fails to explain why certain fishing practices are 
forbidden and when fishing cannot be conducted.  The law does not create 
any stakeholder participation in planning or enforcement.141  A precise plan 
for conservation requires an assignment of rights to individual users that 
places economic and non-economic interests in the ongoing viability and 
health of the CPR.142  Substantively, the law does establish some boundaries 
for protection.  It calls for the creation of sanctuaries to be free from fishing, 
forbids “chopping, reclaiming or firing [sic] the inundated forests,” and bans 
“all means of pumping, bailing, drying any part of fishery domain.”143  
                                           
137
 Kingdom of Cambodia Constitution (1993) art. 59, available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/ 
cambodia.htm. 
138
 See id. 
139
 See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 1.  A plan, according to Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, 
is “a detailed formulation of a program of action” or “an orderly arrangement of parts of an overall design 
or objective.”  Merriam Webster Online-Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/plan. 
140
 Total allowable catch is seen as a necessary component to restricting over-fishing.  It is a common 
theme of sustainable fisheries laws, such as those in New Zealand.  See Kevin Stoakes, Property Rights and 
Ecosystem Management: An Industry Perspective, Bevan Series on Sustainable Fisheries (2006) (abstract 
available at http://courses.washington.edu/susfish/speakers/stokes.html). 
141
 OSTROM, supra note 64. 
142
 See id. at 3. 
143
 Fiat Law, supra note 34, art. 18. 
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However, the Constitution requires more than mere designations and denials; 
it requires a precise plan. 
One obvious reason for the unconstitutionality of the 1987 Fisheries 
Law is mere chronology.  The law was drafted under a socialist government 
at a time of reduced fishing activity.  As such, the drafters focused on 
government-run fishing operations.144  At the same time, the drafters give 
special rights of easy access for subsistence fishing,145 while giving few 
rights to medium sized fishing and aquaculture.146  Moreover, the 1987 
Fisheries Law does not envision the expansion of fish exports or integrating 
the Tonle Sap with international markets—a practice currently underway.147  
While the Draft Fisheries Law divides fishing practices into the same three 
categories, it focuses on parity between all users.  
B. The Land Concession Provisions and Discretionary Exceptions for 
Dams in the Draft Fisheries Law Create Loopholes 
While the Draft Fisheries Law presents a constitutionally valid148 and 
more comprehensive set of conservation-oriented laws, it vests too much 
discretion in the minister of MAFF with regard to the Tonle Sap.  By giving 
the minister of MAFF discretion to grant permits for dam creation and 
certain agricultural development,149 the law fails to protect the Tonle Sap.  
Limits do not exist to cabin the minister’s discretion, and he is relatively free 
to decide when to allow these damaging practices.  This uncertainty burdens 
all users and reduces overall participation in the regulatory scheme.  
Moreover, damming has been noted as one of the more ruinous practices, 
since reduced flow and access will drastically reduce fish populations and 
the overall catch on the Tonle Sap.150  However, because power supply in 
Cambodia continues to be unreliable and a source of frustration for 
                                           
144
 See id. art. 8. 
145
 See id. art. 11.  This section allows for year-round fishing even in protected areas and during the 
closed season. 
146
 Now, however, these two practices have grown tremendously and need better organization and 
legal supervision.  See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 2. 
147
 Although the laws are silent on fish exportation, the Department of Fisheries does take into 
consideration fish exported to Thailand and surrounding countries.  See Department of Fisheries, Major 
Responsibilities, http://www.maff.gov.kh/depts/dof.html (last visited May 12, 2006). 
148
 The Draft Fisheries Law satisfies the Constitution’s call for having “precise plan” by inserting 
such a plan in the preamble and in the substance of the law.  See Merriam Webster Online-Dictionary, 
supra note 139. 
149
 Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 28. 
150
 See E. Baran et al., supra note 126. 
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businesses,151 hydroelectric power derived from damming tributary rivers is 
planned and underway in some areas.152  
Unwisely, Article 28 of the Draft Fisheries Law creates a procedural 
loophole regarding the prohibition on damming and destructive activities on 
the fishery resources.  On its face, Article 28 clearly prohibits “expanding 
farming lands in the fishery domains,” “building dikes/dams,” and “any 
other activities in the fishery domains that may cause destruction of the 
fishery resources.”153  However, the law imbues the minister with discretion 
to permit these activities by giving him the power to lift the ban when he 
sees fit.154  The law fails to explain the types of circumstances that would 
warrant such permission.155  Thus, this vague exception to the prohibition 
sets up a procedural loophole with tremendous potential for abuse.156  This 
sort of policy undermines predictability and allows certain special interest 
groups to occupy positions of power without accountability.157  Proper 
conservation policy requires the elimination of ex parte influence, making 
discretionary function transparent and as logical as possible.158  
The discretionary authority vested in the minister of MAFF by Article 
28 may also undermine the explicit prohibition of other activities delineated 
in the same subchapter.159  For example, Article 34 creates a clear ban on 
using or destroying inundated forests, with no exceptions.160  However, one 
might read Article 28, part of the same subchapter as Article 34, as a means 
of circumventing Article 34 because the minister would still have general 
authority to grant exemptions.  This interpretation seems rather unlikely in 
                                           
151
 Guy De Launey, Lights Out in Phnom Penh, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/business/4740122.stm 
152
 See Mekong Basin Community Rights Project, Background Statement, 
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Environment/Mekong/background.htm; see also James D. Zirin, Cambodia’s 
Glimmer of Hope, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2006, at B3. 
153
 See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, ch. 6, art. 28. 
154
 Id. 
155
 See id. arts. 8-9 (the plain language sets no standards to guide the discretion of the minister in 
finding exemptions to this rule). 
156
 See Michael M. Calavan et al., Cambodian Corruption Assessment, USAID ICQ Contract No. 
DFD-I-00-03-00139-00, Task Order No. 801, Submitted Aug. 19, 2004, at 2 (“[C]orruption…has reached 
‘pandemic’ proportions”).  
157
 See The World Bank, Anti-Corruption, http://www.worldbank.org (follow “anticorruption” 
hyperlink). 
158
 See Press Release, The World Bank, Cambodia and Donors Resolve to Tackle Impediments to 
Development (Mar. 3, 2006) (release no. 2006/295/EAP), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (follow 
“news” hyperlink and enter search for “Cambodia donors”). 
159
 Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, arts. 33-35. Chapter six pertains to the “Management of 
Protected Inundated Areas.”  
160
 Article 34 prohibits “[e]xpanding agricultural lands or using lands in the protected inundated areas 
for all purposes excluding development of fisheries [and] [i]ssuance of Land titles in the protected 
inundated areas.”  Id. art. 34 
SEPTEMBER 2006 CAMBODIA’S FISHERIES LAW 817 
 
  
light of the clear danger that removal of inundated forests creates.  However, 
dams can have a significantly deleterious effect on the fishery, and yet there 
are means of getting permission to build them.  Thus, the lack of clarity 
could be used to conclude that the minister of MAFF can allow some 
reasonable development for the public good.161  As illustrated by the 
previous land laws, the lack of clarity is likely to be exploited.162  A simple 
solution would be to explicitly exempt Article 34 from Article 28’s conferral 
of the discretionary power to the minister of MAFF.  
This Article 28 loophole also raises two other points of conflict 
between the International Agreement on the Protection of Wetlands 
(“IAPW”)163 and the Environmental Protection and National Resource 
Management Laws (“NRML”).164  In 1996 Cambodia officially adopted the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat.165  While this international agreement is arguably soft-
law,166 the law passed by Cambodia does require that it “shall formulate and 
implement . . . planning so as to promote the conservation of the wetlands . . 
. .”
167
  The Draft Fisheries Law, however, undermines the conservation of 
wetlands by allowing discretionary damming and wetlands development.  
Similarly, the Draft Fisheries Law Article 28 waiver provision conflicts with 
the NRML because NRML does not allow discretionary exceptions.168  
NRML requires that the “natural resources of the Kingdom of Cambodia . . . 
shall be preserved, developed and managed to use in a rational and 
                                           
161
 See id. art. 28.  The lack of clarity in the language allows for vague definitions that can be 
manipulated for improper purposes. 
162
 This is an especially valid consideration in a country where corruption is “pandemic.”  See 
Calavan et al., supra note 156, at 2.  For example, there was a case in which the government, pursuant to 
escheat provisions of the 1992 Land Law tried to deceive and coerce nearly 1,000 indigenous land owners 
to give up their rights to 1,250 hectares of land.  See Legal Aid of Cambodia et al., Cambodia: Landmark 
Indigenous Land Rights Case to Be Heard in Ratanakiri Provincial Court: Background Briefing Memo, 
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Cambodia, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/landrights-
bck.htm (last visited May 12, 2006). 
163
 See Adoption of the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, Kram, Oct. 22, 1996 [hereinafter Wetlands Kram]; see also Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, U.N.E.S.C.O., available at 
http://www.ramsar.org/key_conv_e.htm [hereinafter Wetlands Convention]. 
164
 See Environmental Protection and National Resource Management Laws, Kram, Dec. 24, 1996, 
available at http://sunsite.nus.edu.sg/apcel/dbase/cambodia/primary/caaenv.html [hereinafter NRML]. 
165
 Wetlands Kram, supra note 163. 
166
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  Soft law is: “[c]ollectively, rules that are neither 
strictly binding nor completely lacking in legal significance; [and/or] Guidelines, policy declarations, or 
codes of conduct that set standards of conduct but are not legally binding.” 
167
 Wetlands Kram, supra note 163, art. 3. 
168
 Article 28 states that eight prohibited activities, including damming inundated forests, can “be 
conducted only when special permission is given.”  Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 28(B). 
818 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO.3 
 
 
sustainable manner.”169  By vesting major discretion in one minister, as 
Article 28 does, the ability to rationally preserve, develop and manage 
resources in a sustainable manner is less than assured.  In a country where 
corruption is “pandemic,”170 that discretion will likely be subject to private 
interests, which are likely uninterested in sustainability and preservation of 
natural resources.   
It should also be noted that countries neighboring Cambodia have 
considered damming tributary rivers to the Tonle Sap.171  This is a real 
problem facing Southeast Asian countries that are attempting to find greater 
sources of electricity.172  For example, China has proposed damming the 
Mekong, even though there remains much doubt about the efficiency and 
strength of such a hydroelectric source.173  Thus, Cambodia must be 
assertive in setting its own policy to ensure that others do not undermine the 
health of the Tonle Sap. 
C. The Draft Fisheries and Water Pollution Control Laws Fail to 
Establish a Means of Preventing the Introduction of Pesticides and 
Chemical Fertilizers in the Tonle Sap Basin 
The Draft Fisheries Law does not address water pollution.  
Consequently, its narrow scope, combined with gaps in the Water Pollution 
Control Law (“WPCL”), allows the use of herbicides and pesticides to 
degrade the Tonle Sap.174  Just as the U.S. Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 
exempts agricultural activities from the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit system,175 the Cambodian laws do 
not subject agricultural or arboreal practices to any permitting or planning 
regime.176  This oversight, whether purposeful or unintentional, undermines 
the Draft Fisheries Law’s attempt to protect the health and sustainability of 
the Tonle Sap. 
The WPCL presents broad protections against pollution into public 
waters, but fails to bring pollutants incident to agricultural activity under its 
                                           
169
 NRML, supra note 164, art. 8. 
170
 Calavan et al., supra note 156, at 2. 
171
 See International Rivers Network, IRN’s Southeast Asia Campaign, 
http://www.irn.org/programs/seasia/ (last visited May 7, 2006) (detailing recent damming activity in 
Southeast Asia). 
172
 See id. 
173
 See Posey, supra note 131, at 5-8. 
174
 See Council of Ministers, Sub-Decree on Water Pollution Control, No: 27 ANRK.BK, Phnom 
Penh, Apr. 6, 1999 [hereinafter WPCL].  
175
 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). 
176
 See WPCL, supra note 174, Annex 3.  
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permitting system.177  In many ways, the WPCL is stronger than the CWA, in 
that “sources of pollution”178 are defined broadly and not limited to “point 
sources.”179  It covers any direct or indirect discharge of pollutants into 
public water areas, requiring permits for any such discharges from the 
Ministry of Environment (“MOE”).180  However, the WPCL further states 
that only those sources listed in an annex shall be required to have a permit 
from the MOE, thus narrowing the scope of the law.181  Indeed, agricultural 
activity is not listed, although “animal farm[s]” and “aquatic production 
processing” are listed.182  Consequently, the WPCL creates the same 
loophole as the CWA for non-point sources,183 such as for farms near the 
Tonle Sap and its tributaries, which are able to use chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides with no regulation from the MOE.184 
Further, the WPCL fails to cover pesticide and fertilizer use, and the 
Draft Fisheries Law nearsightedly skips over adverse agricultural activity.  
While the Draft Fisheries Law does prohibit “expanding agricultural lands or 
using lands in the protected inundated areas,”185 it does not address 
agricultural uses outside the protected inundated areas.  Both Cambodian 
                                           
177
 Id. arts. 10-17.   
178
 The law defines a “source of pollution” as “any type of places [sic] such as a dwelling house, 
public administrative building, premise, transport facilities, business areas [sic] or service place from which 
effluent, pollutants or hazardous substances are directly or indirectly discharged into public water areas or 
public drainage systems.”  Id. art. 3(b). 
179
 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, 
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged” and excluding “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows 
from irrigated agriculture”).  
180
 WPCL, supra note 174, art. 10. 
181
 Id. art. 11. 
182
 Id. Annex 3. 
183
 See generally David Zaring, Note, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory 
Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (2005).  The 
failures of the CWA to limit the introduction of agricultural and industrial waste into American waters 
should guide the Cambodian laws given the similarities.  The CWA’s biggest failure is in the distinction 
made between point and non-point source pollution.  See id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000); see 33 U.S.C. § 
1362(12), (14) (2000) (detailing the regulations for point and non-point sources).  Non-point source 
discharge falls outside the regulatory scope of the act.  Thus agricultural runoff, including animal waste, 
feedlot runoff, and general sediment are unregulated by the CWA, merely because they enter the water 
table in what cannot be classified as a “point source.”  While the CWA has reduced introduction of 
chemicals, poisons and sediment through point sources, the non-point source remains a danger to its 
effectiveness.  See generally Zaring, supra.   
184
 WPCL, supra note 174, at Annex 3 (excluding chemical fertilizers and pesticides from a list of 
types of pollution for which permits are required).   
185
 See Draft Fisheries Law, supra note 9, art. 5(A)(3).  The laws define protected inundated areas as 
the inundated forests areas “which are covered with floodwater during flooding season and important 
feeding, spawning and breeding habitats for aquatic animals.”  Id.  
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and international non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) ought to be 
aware of the American example and learn from the CWA’s mistakes.  
V. RECOMMENDATION: CAMBODIA NEEDS TO MEET THE BROAD 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION GOALS OF ITS CONSTITUTION 
THROUGH LAND, FORESTRY, AND FISHERY LAWS 
Given the defects in the critical laws affecting the Tonle Sap Basin, 
there are several recommendations that, if followed, can place Cambodia in 
a position to make the Tonle Sap a sustainable fishery.  First, the laws must 
be tightened to create stronger protections for users and the Tonle Sap itself.  
Second, the laws must reference each other and create a much tighter web of 
protective mechanisms.  Third, the laws must provide for proper 
administrative oversight on both national and local levels to assure an even-
handed regulation of fishery, agricultural, and forestry activities.  Lastly, 
Cambodia must make good on international agreements to protect the Tonle 
Sap from undue influences from other the activities of other Southeast Asian 
countries.  At the same time, these recommendations must account for the 
lack of money and education of the country, as well as its weak enforcement 
and the general corruption of the government. 
A. Cambodia Needs to Restructure the Power Allocations Within the 
Management and Administrative Regime on the Tonle Sap 
Given the size and importance of the Tonle Sap, a more formal and 
stricter set of laws and regulations is necessary.  Although smaller fisheries 
such as Celilo Falls186 were successful with few regulations, a large-scale 
fishery such as the Tonle Sap needs formal laws, strict management controls, 
and evolving catch limits based on increased scientific data.  Regulations 
and enforcement must be managed on both a national and local level so as to 
avoid devolution of federal authority while ensuring that local users do not 
abuse or overuse the resources because of the availability of markets.187  The 
key, then, is to ensure participation of local users and officials of every level 
in order to design a system to best fit the common pool resource.  Emphasis 
should be placed in incorporating people of all ethnicities, educational 
levels, and each gender into the system of legislation and adjudication on the 
Tonle Sap.188   
                                           
186
 See DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 15. 
187
 THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION 20-21 (Nives Dolsak & 
Elinor Ostrom eds., 2003). 
188
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 32.  
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Moreover, several important lessons of the Celilo Fish Committee can 
be taken away and applied to the Tonle Sap.  First, there must be a means of 
allocation of property rights on the fishery in a broad and meaningful way.  
Currently, the fish lot system works only to distribute narrowly to a small 
number of users, and many users appear to be left out.  At the same time, 
rather than simply privatize the entire fishery, there can be what Ostrom calls 
an “alternative” solution whereby the users “make a binding contract to 
commit themselves to a cooperative strategy that they themselves will work 
out.”189  That is, users have a property interest that exists only with the 
assumption of a quasi-contractual obligation to use the resource in a manner 
that benefits all the users.  In a sense, this binds all the users to stave off the 
tragedy of the commons by reducing the ability to externalize the cost of 
over production.190  This self-limitation for the good of the community can 
be easily seen at Celilo Falls, where Indian fishermen fished only at certain 
times, took just enough to eat and sell for subsistence, and ensured that other 
users abided by the rules.191  Second, there must be a means of monitoring 
and imposing sanctions for transgression of the laws on the Tonle Sap.  
There ought to be both clear rules and locally managed supervisors.  Ideally 
the supervisors will be the users themselves.192 Indeed, small-scale, self-
managing fishery communities hold promise for Cambodians who rely on 
the resource for subsistence.  With a well-placed and functioning regulatory 
structure, such alternatives are possible within the broader, national fishery 
framework. 
Decentralization is often viewed as an ideal method of creating good 
governance of CPRs, but this is a new concept in Cambodia, where a strong 
centralized government has dominated.193  The success of decentralization in 
certain cases has hinged on the degree of cooperation and influence given to 
local participants.194  An attractive balancing scheme of local and national 
interest might be found in a federalist approach of local supervision with 
national administrative and enforcement protections.195  The United States 
                                           
189
 OSTROM, supra note 64, at 15. 
190
 Id. 
191
 See DUPRIS ET AL., supra note 67, at 263.  
192
 OSTROM, supra note 64, at 19-20.  In Alanya, Turkey, for example, a small group of about 100 
fishermen shared fishing sites and monitored each other quite closely so that no one user ruined any fishing 
location.  That was a very successful and sustainable fishery, quite similar to the Celilo Falls fishery.  Id. at 
18-20. 
193
 Samath et al., supra note 4, at 347. 
194
 Id. at 368. 
195
 D.S. Butterworth & A.E. Punt, The Role of Harvest Control Laws, Risk and Uncertainty and the 
Precautionary Approach in Ecosystem-System Management, presented at Reykjavik Conference on 
Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem (Oct. 1-4, 2001).  
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uses this scheme for regional fishery interests where “regional fishery 
management councils recommend management plans and regulations to the 
Secretary of Commerce, who holds the ultimate authority for their approval 
and responsibility for their consistency with federal law.”196  The most 
successful approach would likely require local committees working with the 
MAFF and regional groups to regulate practices on the Tonle Sap. 
B. Cambodia Must Restructure, Clarify, and Expand the Fishery Laws 
Paramount to the creation of a sustainable fishery on the Tonle Sap is 
the reformation of the legal regimes affecting the use and development of 
the fishery.  First, the Draft Fisheries Law must be amended to provide clear 
and distinct prohibitions for harmful activities on the basin.  Second, the 
laws must expand the defined area of the Tonle Sap.  Third, the fishery laws 
must coordinate with other environmental laws and the 1993 Constitution to 
create a clear and comprehensive framework.  Fourth, the administrative and 
enforcement agencies must be strengthened by greater regional and local 
participation.   
Assuming the adoption of the Draft Fisheries Law, there are several 
loopholes that must be closed to make the laws a basis for a model of 
sustainability.  First, discretion vested in the Ministry of Fisheries ought to 
be limited by removing the open-ended discretionary exemptions in Article 
28 of the Draft Fisheries Law.  The minister’s power ought to be balanced by 
local councils of users who can better monitor and advise MAFF on 
important fishery issues.  If flexibility is needed, then discretionary 
exceptions should derive from a council composed of national, regional, and 
local actors who can best assess the impacts of the proposed action.  At the 
very least, there should be guidelines, such as a “for cause” showing, as to 
why an exception should be granted. 
Second, the fisheries law must be broadened in scope so as to create a 
management system that encapsulates the entire reach of the Tonle Sap.197  If 
the area under the scope of the fisheries law does not include the 
non-inundated forests and agricultural land, a great amount of silt and 
                                           
196
 Susan Hanna, Transition in the American Fishing Commons: Management Problems and 
Institutional Design Challenges, in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND 
ADAPTATION, supra note 187, at 62. 
197
 Setting a protective buffer can be a critical part of establishing a resource management plan.  See 
James M. Acheson & Jennifer F. Brewer, Changes in the Territorial System of the Maine Lobster Industry, 
in THE COMMONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHALLENGES AND ADAPTATION, supra note 187, at 54.  The 
current scope of the protective boundary is simply too small to cover the entire basin.  See Creation and 
Designation of Protected Areas, Royal Decree, Nov. 1, 1993 (establishing the protective area and defining 
its borders) [original on file with author]. 
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sediment will be further introduced.  While removal of inundated forests is a 
major cause of destruction of fish, nearby forests on the Mekong and other 
rivers can have just as great a negative impact.  By broadening the scope of 
the laws and the attendant prohibitions, a greater area will come into the 
control of the resource management agencies and more comprehensive 
decisions can be made. 
Structurally, the fisheries law should project a more cohesive and 
integrated system of local, regional, and national management.  The Asian 
Development Bank (“ADB”) recommends a system of decentralization,198 
but total independence from MAFF or national groups would probably be 
unwise.  The collective choice model of governance ought to include the 
national as well as the local concerns.  At the same time, total national 
control is unwise given the lack of “on-the-ground” knowledge and the 
strong potential for corruption.  A feasible solution to this is a network of 
councils to inform all levels of the decision making process.  Adjusting the 
laws to require local and regional participation in the MOE and MAFF 
decision-making will strengthen the laws and rules for better management.  
Further, it will avoid the problems that were rampant under the Land Law of 
1992 such as a lack of participation and ignorance of the laws.  This will 
create more thorough and planned decision making.  
The network of environmental-related laws must be tightened to work 
in concert and to support the Constitution.  Between the forestry, land, water 
and fishery laws, gaps exist that can and will be exploited by users on all 
levels.199  For example, the forestry laws should make explicit reference to 
safe harvesting practices in areas critical to inland fisheries.  Likewise, the 
land laws should make concessions impossible in areas that will have an 
adverse impact on the fisheries.  This change can be implemented by 
amending each law to reference the relevant fishery, forestry or land law.  It 
can also be done by giving better financing to local and regional bodies, like 
MOE, to coordinate the uses subject to all the laws.  A broader scope and 
more direct referencing between environmental laws will ensure a cohesive 
and protective web for inland fisheries. 
                                           
198
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 16-19. 
199
 Given the fact that corruption is rampant, the silence in the forestry, land and water laws regarding 
impacts on the fisheries creates a legal means of avoiding consideration of the fisheries for activities such 
as logging, dumping waste or developing lands in wetland areas.  Although the laws are designed to be 
exclusive to each sector of the MAFF, there needs to be language in each sector’s laws that the laws work 
together—that one cannot get around a law by relying on the silence in another. 
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C. Cambodia Must Strengthen Administrative Agencies to Ensure a Fair 
System of Fish Lot Lotteries and Enforcement of Sustainable Farming 
Proper administration and enforcement will become more necessary 
as the Tonle Sap and Cambodia become more widely recognized.200  
Currently, the MOE “is a politically weak ministry compared to, for 
instance, [MAFF], and has severe difficulties in forcing its will on other 
political interests.”201  While the MAFF may become stronger, it does not 
have the proper structure to administer and enforce the laws.202  Many 
observers have pointed out the lack of agency coordination at local and 
regional levels.203  Thus, restructuring and creating local MAFF offices will 
help.  By involving local actors in the process of establishing, improving and 
enforcing the laws, decision-makers will be better informed.  
More reliance should also be placed on the Mekong River 
Commission (“MRC”).204  The MRC can be relied on to help ensure that the 
sustainable practices on the Tonle Sap and regulate damming activity.205  
However, the MRC itself needs to be expanded and its regulations made 
binding.206  If that can be accomplished, then Cambodia can help limit 
adverse impacts of Chinese damming of the Mekong by coordinating the 
four member countries in opposition.  Moreover, having a broad coalition 
that represents both development and preservation interests of four nations 
helps ensure well-conceived, multilateral action.   
By increasing the strength of the MAFF and MRC, Cambodia can 
create a protective network that can contain damaging practices in the 
greater Tonle Sap Basin.  The MAFF needs greater funding and localization, 
while the MRC needs expanded powers.  Together, these two policy changes 
can provide protection from both domestic and international destruction. 
                                           
200
 See World Lakes Network, supra note 22, at 8-9. 
201
 Samath et al., supra note 4, at 356. 
202
 The ADB suggests that the MAFF and other agencies have been crippled by rigid a command and 
control mentality and a lack of funding.  ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 13, at 12.  On the Tonle 
Sap itself, a lack of enforcement has been recognized by MAFF as the leading contribution to the 
“anarchy” in the fisheries sector.  See MAFF, supra note 37, at 3. 
203
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, supra note 7, at 16-19. 
204
 Structurally, the MRC provides a large representative Council, a Joint Council creating and 
implementing policy and a Secretariat who provides technical and administrative support.  See MRC, About 
the MRC, http://www.mrcmekong.org/about_mrc.htm#MRC (last visited May 12, 2006). 
205
 A look at the hydroelectric policy reveals that the MRC makes broad considerations of not only 
the economic but also the environmental and social interests.  See MRC, MRC Hydropower Development 
Strategy (2001), available at http://www.mrcmekong.org/programmes/hydropower.htm (follow “MRC 
Hydropower Development Strategy” hyperlink).  
206
 Currently the regulations and laws coming out of the MRC are seen as useless.  See Posey, supra 
note 131, at 2. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As Cambodia fast-forwards into the modern realities of the twenty-
first century, it faces the challenging dilemma of both preserving and 
capitalizing on its natural resources.  In a country reliant on manual labor, 
agricultural work, and fishing, laws that regulate and protect natural 
resources are of extreme importance.  Where fishing is concerned, the 
Cambodia’s current legal system needs improvement.  The current laws 
should be replaced with up-to-date and comprehensive laws that establish a 
sustainable model for coastal and inland fisheries.  Further, the relevant 
Water, Land and Forestry laws must be amended to both protect fisheries 
from related harmful practices and create secondary protections for fishery 
sustainability.  Lastly, Cambodia must reformulate its administrative 
structure to enfranchise fishery users at every level, creating a quasi-federal 
model of management.  Changes in the abovementioned areas will help 
Cambodia protect, preserve, and use wisely its largest fishery, the Tonle Sap, 
Southeast Asia’s Great Lake. 
